India’s Involvement in Regional Trade Agreements: Is it a Second Best Strategy? by Nag, Biswajit & Chakraborty, Debashis
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
India’s Involvement in Regional Trade
Agreements: Is it a Second Best
Strategy?
Nag, Biswajit and Chakraborty, Debashis
Indian Institute of Foreign Trade, Qutab Institutional Area, New
Delhi, 110016, INDIA
27 August 2007
Online at https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/4596/
MPRA Paper No. 4596, posted 24 Aug 2007 UTC
Draft 
 
 
 
India’s Involvement in Regional Trade Agreements:  
Is it a Second Best Strategy? 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
There is no systematic evidence that ‘trade creation’ will always outweigh the 
‘trade diversion’ effect while countries are engaged in regional trade agreements (RTAs). 
Despite that countries are now rapidly engaged in various RTAs which include even 
partners beyond their own region. India’s engagement in various RTAs may be due to the 
effect of ‘competitive regionalism’ which is apparent in Asia-Pacific region or 
alternatively shaping up the strategy of reducing MFN rate. Moreover, India is taking up 
RTA route to push exports of service sector as well. The current analysis makes an 
attempt to assess nitty-gritty of RTAs where India is involved and explore its strategy in 
details considering its regional preference, timeline, product coverage etc.   
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I. Introduction 
 
Regional cooperation across countries enhances the trade potential among 
themselves, apart from helping them to realize economies of scale and greater 
specialization in production by overcoming the smallness of domestic markets (ESCAP 
2004). This could explain the recent upsurge in the number of Regional Trade 
Agreements (RTAs).i The advantages of regional integration for WTO members have 
become all the more lucrative recently given the modest outcome of the Hong Kong 
Ministerial (2005) and the slow progress of multilateral negotiations thereafter. Though 
article XXIV of GATT and V of GATS allow countries to form RTAs, many developing 
countries took the advantage of  “Enabling Clause” which permits  significant relaxation 
of the conditions for RTA-formation involving only developing countries regarding 
coverage of trade, tariff reduction commitments etc. The number of RTAs is increasing 
by leaps and bounds despite the fact that there is no systematic evidence that ‘trade 
creation’ will always outweigh the ‘trade diversion’ effect.ii 
 
Asia-Pacific economies in general have derived significant gain through trade 
liberalization (regional as well as unilateral). Though multilateral process is also 
combined with this effort, most of the countries do not want to remain outside the 
purview of RTAs due to the presumption of net gains which made others join PTAs (the 
domino effect). Also competitive liberalization in the region has created a force and 
pressure on many countries to follow suit. This has created an environment of 
‘competitive regionalism’ in which liberalizing countries joined together and sought a 
broader agreement going beyond the idea of securing trade interest only (Bonapace and 
Mikic, 2006). Despite the density of several Asia-Pacific agreements (both bilateral and 
sub-regional), for the time being, at least, it appears that the agreements in force are 
relatively light. The agreements hardly cover all tradable goods and services; bypass 
investment, and contain restrictive rules of origin (ROOs). Most PTAs look for complete 
elimination of trade barriers after 2010 and some beyond 2015. Relatively poorer 
countries are making an effort to bring balance between unilateral and regional 
liberalization policy and seek a longer time to liberalise completely.  
 
Of late, several countries are adopting deeper cooperation (focusing on 
investment and services) bilaterally through Comprehensive Economic Cooperation 
Agreements (CECA). However, debates have been generated regarding the success of 
investment agreements vis-à-vis attracting FDI through unilateral liberalization. 
Overflow of investment rules along with trade related investment measures (TRIMS) and 
establishment of commercial presence under mode 3 of GATS create confusion among 
policy makers. Integration efforts have generated sufficient investment opportunities in 
Asian region both in case of production and infrastructure development including 
transport system, but intra-regional investment (mainly south –south investment) is yet to 
take off. Despite investment opportunities in service sector, services negotiation in most 
cases are yet to resolve all the related issues such as positive list, nature of trade barriers, 
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safeguard measures, associated issues such as movement of natural persons and mutual 
recognition of professionals etc., thereby leading to lower intra-regional investment 
realization.   
 
In addition, the negotiation regarding ROOs takes long time and many RTAs 
bring forth a complicated regime having both ‘value addition’ based rules as well as 
‘product specific’ rules. Existing ROOs act as a considerable NTM since the costs of 
compliance are high, involving very complex procedures and compliance with stringent 
norms.iii Also, proliferation of overlapping RTAs created complexity due to multiple 
ROOs. 
 
India is a relatively late entrant in RTA race. Currently, it is negotiating a number 
of RTAs, spread over Asia, Africa and Latin America. While this move would help India 
to gain market access in partner countries, it nonetheless has to compete with other RTA-
partners in the importing country market (e.g. – China in ASEAN). During the 
negotiation of RTAs, India is confronting several issues such as long negative list, 
overlapping ROOs, etc. It has also slowed down the RTA discussion for some countries 
(e.g. - China), while expressing interest with new partners (e.g. - Russia). Domestic 
sensitivity has become quite an important issue in India while preparation of list of 
products for negotiation. With this background, the paper makes an attempt to understand 
India’s strategy towards its growing involvement with several trade blocs (and also 
bilateral PTAs) and analyse them in light of its overall trade policy.  
 
The paper is arranged along the following lines. First, an analysis is done 
regarding the geographical spread of India’s RTAs and its regional preferences. Then, 
timeline of these agreements, product coverage and issues related to ROOs are discussed. 
From this, India’s possible strategy regarding regional cooperation is chalked out before 
the conclusion is drawn.   
 
II.  India’s Involvement in RTAs/BTAs: Geographical Spread 
 
India’s current major PTA / FTA participations, both operational as well as 
ongoing ones, are summarized in Table 1. India is also involved in various forms of 
PTAs with Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Mongolia and Nepal. While for some 
Asian blocs, a major part of the negotiations have been concluded, the discussion is going 
on for several other proposed collaborations.  
 
The Joint Study Groups (JSG) for China and South Korea had recommended 
creation of an FTA and CECA respectively. An Economic Agreement with Japan is 
likely to follow shortly. JSGs are still analyzing the feasibility of a bilateral Economic 
Partnership Agreement and CECA in case of Indonesia and Malaysia respectively. 
Recently the possibility of PTAs with Canada and Russia is also being discussed. In 
coming future, a FTA negotiation with the EU may be initiated. Since 2003, also there 
have been discussions on India-Brazil-South Africa (IBSA) enhanced trade and energy 
cooperation, although no PTA has so far been reached. In July 2006, the Indian Cabinet 
cleared a proposal for negotiating a Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement (CFTA) with 
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SACU within a reasonable time, but little progress has been observed on that front. The 
PTA between India and Chile has been signed in March 2006, which may in future be 
extended FTA.  
 
Table 1: India’s Involvement in RTAs – A Summery 
 
Asia Africa Latin America 
Operational 
• Indo-Lanka FTA 
• SAFTA 
• Bangkok Agreement (Now APTA) 
• India-Thailand FTA  
• India-Singapore CECA 
  
Ongoing 
• India-GCC Framework Agreement on 
Economic Cooperation 
• India-ASEAN CECA 
• BIMSTEC FTA 
• India-Australia Trade and Economic 
Framework Agreement 
• Indo-Israel PTA 
• India-SACU CFTA 
• India-Mauritius 
CECPA  
• Indo-MERCOSUR 
PTA 
• Indo-Chile PTA 
Joint Study Group 
• China, Korea, Japan, Malaysia, Indonesia   
Constructed by Authors 
 
III. Analysis of India’s Engagement in Different RTAs/BTAs 
 
IIIA. Regional Preference: 
 
Table 1 indicates that India’s RTA agenda is heavily skewed towards Asian 
partners, given its region-wise trade orientation (see Table2). Moreover, in post financial 
crisis as ASEAN members are looking for internal demand oriented growth and it has 
given fresh opportunity to India to increase its export to them. West Asian countries are 
traditionally major trade partners of India and hence, India is making an effort to cement 
the increased export orientation with them through formation of RTAs with Gulf 
Cooperation Council (GCC).  
 
Till now, India’s most effective RTA engagements are SAFTA, India-ASEAN, 
India-Thailand, India-Sri Lanka and India-Singapore agreement. This is reflected in 
number of meetings India attended, its preparedness and the intensity with which it is 
engaged in negotiation. In the India-ASEAN FTA, the Trade Negotiation Committee 
already met more than 14 times. In case of Indo-Lanka FTA, the agreement is operational 
for more than five years now and these two countries are engaged to increase its coverage 
to include services and investment.  
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Table 2: An Analysis of Trade Scenario between India and Proposed Partners – 
Continent-Wise 
(Percentage Share) 
Export Import Location of Countries 
1996-97 2005-06 1996-97 2005-06 
Implemented and Ongoing 
West Asia 7.30 11.56 11.16 5.27
South Asia 5.08 5.24 0.61 0.91
East And South-East Asia 19.20 21.63 20.65 23.68
Africa 1.44 1.70 0.85 1.69
Latin America 0.84 1.44 1.16 1.40
Overall 33.86 41.58 34.42 32.96
New Interest 
Canada (North America) 1.05 0.99 0.80 0.62
Russia (Europe and Asia) 2.42 0.71 1.35 1.36
Constructed from India’s Trade Data 
 
 
BIMSTEC as an FTA though missed the deadline; in terms of aspiration it is 
attractive to many South Asian countries. APTA has completed third round of negotiation 
and China’s entry into it provided fresh momentum. On the contrary, India-SACU PTA is 
not moving forward. Similarly, although annexes for India-MERCOSUR agreement was 
were finalized in 2005, it is yet to be ratified in MERCOSUR. Same is true for India-
Chile PTA, signed in 2006. Since India’s effective RTA strategy is significantly biased 
towards Asian countries, it needs to keep the Chinese move in mind. In future, India has 
to compete with China for increasing trade share in ASEAN and even in SAARC, as 
observed from Table 3.  
 
Table 3: India and China’s Trade Share (%) with ASEAN and SAARC 
 
Trade with ASEAN 
Category Country 2000 2002 2005 
India 5.56 6.99 7.61Export Share of 
  China 5.36 7.33 7.05
India 11.53 10.16 9.57Import Share of 
  China 5.27 6.83 7.41
Trade with SAARC 
India 4.39 5.28 5.39Export Share of 
  China 1.52 1.67 2.09
India 0.97 0.86 0.95Import Share of  
  China 0.84 0.98 1.63
Source: Calculated from data available in COMTRADE database 
Export Share: % of ‘Export to World’ going to Trade groups (ASEAN/SAARC) 
Import Share: % of ‘Import from World’ coming to Trade groups (ASEAN/SAARC) 
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IIIB. Timeline 
 
The implementation period of the PTAs/FTAs in Asia-Pacific region are usually 
spread over five to ten years, or even longer. These agreements provide room for special 
and differential treatment to LDCs providing longer time to eliminate tariff and offer 
safeguard measures and or concession regarding ROOs. Most of the recent agreements in 
the region attempt to reap benefits faster through ‘early harvest scheme (EHS)’ or ‘fast 
track’ products.  However, India-centric agreements like Indo-Thai FTA witnessed 
apprehension over negative repercussions of EHS among Indian SMEs. In RTAs of Asia-
Pacific region, most of the members would like to keep flexibilities through ‘plans of 
action’ rather than ‘binding’ commitments and ‘sanctions’ (as in EU). As a result of this, 
implementation often takes longer time than expected and sometimes it is even half-
hearted.  
 
The timeline of India’s major RTA engagements are as follows. In case of 
BIMSTEC FTA, tariff elimination for developing countries under normal track would be 
achieved by June 2012, starting from July 2007. For Indo-Thai FTA, zero-duty imports 
would be achieved by 2010. SAFTA became operational from 2006 and the tariff 
liberalization programme is expected to be completed by 2013 for India, Pakistan and the 
Maldives; 2014 for Sri Lanka and 2016 for Bangladesh, Bhutan and Nepal. The 
discussion shows that most of the Asian RTAs would be converted into FTA between 
2015-2020, thereby creating pressure on India to go by the same timeline in general. 
Hence, if the negotiation in existing RTAs is delayed or newer discussions are initiated 
with other Asian countries, India’s flexibility regarding timeline will gradually get 
tightened.  
 
IIIC. Scuffle over Product Coverage: Looking into Select RTAs 
 
The RTAs involving India mostly include developing countries and LDCs and 
hence the question of maintaining a safeguard provision to curb import under certain 
conditions was very important. Moreover, given the similarity in the structure of 
manufacturing output, mutual agreement on a negative / sensitive list for each country, 
which would be excluded from the tariff commitments, was necessary. India has directly 
and indirectly looked for a staggered approach towards tariff reduction; the product 
coverage to start with is not extensive but increases gradually. However, India’s approach 
towards NTMs is not clear as in most of the RTAs the list of NTMs is not yet prepared, 
keeping aside the negotiation on them.  
 
Looking into India’s RTAs, SAFTA currently allows its members to maintain 
sensitive list (longer list for LDC) which may be reviewed in every four years to reduce 
its size. Moreover, the non-LDCs are supposed to compensate the LDCs for the revenue 
loss caused owing to the tariff reforms undertaken. BIMSTEC FTA adopted a sectoral 
initiative approach, where textile & clothing, drugs & pharmaceuticals, gems & jewelry, 
horticulture and floriculture products, processed foods, automotive industry & parts, 
rubber, tea & coffee, coconut and spices were identified for negotiation in addition to 
‘negative list’ and ‘safeguard list’. Interestingly, BIMSTEC does not have any provision 
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for revenue loss compensation to LDCs, resulting from tariff reductions and elimination 
as in case of SAFTA. Hence, it makes more sense for India and Sri Lanka to access 
Nepal and Bangladesh market through BIMSTEC FTA rather then SAFTA. This aspect 
contributed significantly in making the negotiation process longer. Indian domestic 
industry favoured incorporation of textile and completely-built units (CBUs) of all four-
wheelers and two-wheelers from Thailand in the negative list.  
Due to scuffle over negative list between India and ASEAN, India reduced its 
negative list from 1,414 to 854 items in mid-2006 and further to 600 products. Finally, 
this got settled to a negative list of 490 products with a trade value cap of 5%. The 
negotiations in trade in services and investment got delayed in the process as they would 
begin after conclusion of the agreement on trade in goods. In case of Indo-Lanka FTA, 
India and Sri Lanka agreed to have 429 and 1180 tariff lines in their negative list 
respectively. In APTA after three rounds, India has offered concession in total on 527 
products and 48 products especially for LDC. In contrast to this, China offered 
concession on 1697 products and 161 products especially for LDCs.  
 
Similarly in other PTAs, India’s concession has been less compared to its 
partners. For example, in India-Chile PTA, India and Chile have offered concession on 
178 and 296 tariff lines at HS 8 digit level respectively. In 2005, India and MERCOSUR 
agreed to give tariff concession to the partner on 450 and 452 tariff lines respectively.  
 
IIID. Rules of Origin 
  
Usually three criteria may be followed for determining ROOs for the goods 
qualified for tariff preference: (1) Value-added method, (2) Change in Tariff Heading 
(CTH) and (3) Local Content requirement. However, the blocs may also prefer more than 
one criterion. Determining balanced ROOs is all the more important for India owing to 
the multiplicity of RTAs that it has entered into. For instance, it collaborates with 
Bangladesh through APTA, BIMSTEC and SAFTA; with Sri Lanka through APTA, 
BIMSTEC, ILFTA and SAFTA; with Thailand through BIMSTEC FTA, Indo-ASEAN 
FTA and Indo-Thai FTA. Therefore, unless properly specified, goods coming from one 
partner may be eligible for more than one ROOs norm, leading to future trade disputes. 
Already India and Sri Lanka has put forward their complaints regarding circumvention of 
ROO under ILFTA (Nag, 2006). The ambiguity in calculation of value-addition in 
ILFTA caused India to suffer in several traditional products of Kerala (Choudhury, 2006) 
like rubber, spice etc. Also despite the fact that Sri Lanka does not have copper mine, 
India’s import of copper from it increased significantly owing to violations of ROOs 
norms (Guha Thakurta, 2007). Indian firms established in Sri Lanka exported back to 
India with little value addition on imported Indian copper scraps.    
 
Table 4 shows that the RTAs involving India mostly depend on the value-
addition method for determining tariff preference. The effective strategy to handle the 
issues related to ROOs have not been debated significantly within the country as a result 
of which India’s stand remains quite cursory in most of the trade negotiation. India 
preferred both the value addition and CTH method for ROOs determination, arguing that 
the value addition method alone is not adequate for the purpose as high wage rates or 
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high rent can increase the product value even without substantial physical value addition. 
However, the partners in APTA, BIMSTEC FTA, Indo-ASEAN FTA and Indo-Thai FTA 
did not agree with this view and only value addition norms were preferred for that 
purpose (FE, 2005). As more engagement in bilateral PTAs create overlapping rules, it is 
better that India should concentrate on full cumulation while calculating the value added 
part in RTAs such as BIMSTEC FTA and SAFTA.  
 
Table 4: Rules of Origin Provisions in Selected Indian BTAs/RTAs  
 
Trade 
Agreement 
Change in 
Tariff 
Classification 
Specific 
Manufacturing 
Process 
Local Value 
Addition 
Cumulation 
Involving India 
Indo-Thailand 
FTA 
Yes (or VA) – 4, 
6 digit level 
product specific 
- 20–40 percent 
product specific FOB 
value  
Bilateral 
India-Sri Lanka 
FTA 
Yes (or VA) – 4 
digit level  
- 35 percent FOB value Bilateral 
APTA No tariff heading 
change necessary 
No specific 
process required 
45 percent FOB value 
(35 percent for LDC) 
Full 
Source: Quoted from Bonapace and Mikic (2006) 
 
IV. Formulating India’s RTA Strategy  
 
UNCTAD (2005) noted that the share of intra-regional trade as a percentage of 
global trade is generally low in South-South Agreements vis-à-vis North-North 
Agreements. The extent of intra-regional trade across different RTAs is substantially low 
in Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa (Smith, 2004). ASEAN (23 percent) and MERCOSUR 
(18 percent) were cited as having attained and maintained a relatively high degree of 
intra-regional trade, while the same for Central American Common Market (CACM), 
West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU), Caribbean Community and 
Common Market (CARICOM) and Southern Africa Development Community (SADC) 
has been moderate (10-14 percent). The same for SAARC is quite low (5-6 percent). The 
reasons behind this include underdeveloped supply capabilities, and the prevalence of 
similar and undiversified output structures amongst members of some RTAs, which 
reduces the trade potential amongst partners there. This latter reason has fuelled the 
growing appeal for involving cross-regional partners in RTAs. To some extent domino’s 
effect in the region affected India but it played a very cautious role and made an effort to 
take the domestic constituency into confidence. Recent move towards formation of RTAs 
with developed countries (e.g. – Australia, Canada, EU) shows that cross-regional RTAs 
would be new choice of India in near future. Through RTAs/BTAs India would like to 
increase its share in the world trade, trade-GDP ratio and taking some of its partners into 
confidence for multilateral discussion at the WTO through developing common stand.   
 
Enhanced Trade  
Trade barriers in traditional export markets like EU and US (Mehta, 2005) and 
newer NTMs in emerging Asian markets (Saqib and Taneja, 2005) prompted India to 
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consider the RTA route. Moreover through this, India would like to push services and 
investment negotiation especially in East and South-East Asia. India’s Trade 
Complementarity Index (TCI) (see Table 5) with South Asian countries, China, ASEAN 
members and North East Asian countries are generally increasing over 1999 to 2003, 
signifying a high trade potential (Nag, 2005).iv Quite interestingly, TCI gains are 
observed also in case of Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay, i.e., the major trading partners of 
India in Latin America. We already observed that India is providing significant 
importance to RTA formation in Asia, while the discussion is moving relatively slowly 
with countries from other regions.  
 
Table 5: India’s Trade Complementarity Index (Export) with Select Partners 
 
Partner TCI 1999 TCI 2003 Partner TCI 1999 TCI 2003 
Agrentina 27.18 33.79 Nepal 39.72 41.65 
Brazil 25.29 31.76 Saudi Arabia 32.11 32.54 
China 24.90 29.11 Singapore 21.81 28.26 
Indonesia 29.01 35.37 South Africa 36.86 32.99 
Korea 30.39 31.28 Sri Lanka 35.60 37.70 
Malaysia 20.64 27.15 Thailand 28.66 29.78 
Maldives 28.22 42.81 Uruguay 28.94 34.15 
Calculated from India’s Trade Data 
 
However, even though India’s trade share is low in other regions, there is a need 
to understand its export growth potential. Intra-industry trade (IIT)v as calculated in 
Table 6 shows that India’s trade in intermediate goods are quite high with south and 
south-east Asian countries (e.g. - ASEAN, BIMSTEC, China, SAARC). Interestingly, the 
figure is relatively at lower for India-SACU, India-Sri Lanka, India-Australia PTA. This 
is important for developing the product coverage. With South Africa, India’s TCI has 
come down and also it has low IIT index. This shows that South Africa as a country 
should get relatively low importance in strategizing India’s FTA policies. With 
MERCOSUR, IIT is low as trade is mainly on primary and agricultural products. 
 
Table 6: India’s Intra-Industry Trade with Select Partners (2005) 
 
Trade Bloc IIT-Index Trade Bloc IIT-Index 
ASEAN 32.81 SACU 9.96
Australia 17.09 SAFTA 39.16
BIMSTEC 38.17 Indo-Lanka FTA 18.95
China 31.42 Indo-Thai FTA 27.20
MERCOSUR 22.28 Indo-Singapore CECA 25.24
Calculated from India’s Trade Data 
 India’s higher average tariff vis-à-vis its regional partners creates a feeling that 
India would be a net looser, as it has to reduce its tariff faster than the partners. However, 
India’s gain would be larger only when it is able to address the NTMs on imports by its 
PTA/FTA partners. Only in Indo-ASEAN FTA the work has started with the preparation 
of the list of NTMs of each member. SAARC and BIMSTEC are yet to address this issue 
effectively.  
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Other Issues  
We earlier mentioned that though Asian trade blocs are making an effort to bring 
investment under their purview (e.g. - Framework Agreement in ASEAN investment 
Area, 1998), the intra-regional flow of FDI remains relatively low. Same is true for 
India’s FDI sources as well its outbound investment. Hence, the effect of India’s effort in 
bringing investment on the table of negotiation is doubtful. In case of services, none of 
the regional negotiations has brought out a clear picture and resolved related issues. In 
case of trade facilitation (TF), although ASEAN has made attempts through ASEAN 
Custom Vision 2020, SAFTA is yet to develop the details of TF. In case of transit trade 
and transportation, BIMSTEC is making a special effort but SAFTA is still lagging 
behind despite this being a core issue. India may address these issues in Indo-Lanka 
CECA currently under negotiation, but it still lacks the strategy to strike a deal through 
give and take approach. ASEAN is providing significant importance towards energy 
cooperation (e.g ASEAN Power grid, Tran ASEAN gas pipeline). India needs to develop 
negotiating skill to address these issues in the forum of BIMSTEC, SAARC as well as in 
GCC. 
 
India has been quite vocal since Doha Ministerial (2001) onwards (Chakraborty, 
2005; Chakraborty and Sengupta, 2006) and subsequently joined a number of developing 
country collaborations (e.g. - ABI, G-20, G-33, G-110 and NAMA-11) for ensuring 
benefits from WTO negotiations. Table 7 shows the dominance of India’s RTA partners 
in developing country negotiating collaborations. India has already made several joint 
submissions with many of its trade bloc partners (Nag and Chakraborty, 2006), indicating 
another application of the RTA strategy.  
 
Table 7: India’s Negotiating Collaborations and Regional Agreement Partners 
 
Negotiating Alliance at 
WTO 
Asian RTA Partners Non-Asian RTA 
Partners 
Like Minded Group (General) Indonesia, Malaysia, Pakistan - 
G-20 (Agriculture) Bangladesh, China, Indonesia, Korea, 
Malaysia, Pakistan, Philippines, 
Singapore, Sri Lanka, Thailand 
Chile, Uruguay 
G-33 (Agriculture) China, Indonesia, Korea, Mongolia, 
Pakistan, Philippines, Sri Lanka, 
Botswana 
NAMA-11 (Non-Agriculture) Indonesia, Philippines Argentina, Brazil, 
Namibia, South Africa 
ABI (Non-Agriculture) - Argentina, Brazil 
G-24 (Services) Indonesia, Malaysia, Pakistan, 
Philippines, Sri Lanka, Thailand 
Argentina, Brazil, 
Paraguay, Uruguay  
Friends of Geographical 
indications (TRIPS) 
Pakistan, Sri Lanka and Thailand - 
Constructed by Authors 
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V. Way Forward 
 
Looking at the blocs, it can be argued that India’s interest in BIMSTEC is in 
energy and tourism; with Singapore in attracting FDI; with Sri Lanka in export of 
services such as banking, education and health; and with Thailand in creating a 
competitive market for its SME products, machineries and cooperation in electronic 
goods. India would make an attempt to get integrated with the East and South East Asia 
through ASEAN by bringing its MFN rates down to ASEAN level. Moreover, to open 
land border for surface transport, India’s interest lies more in SAARC and BIMSTEC. 
Sub-regional stability is an important agenda for India, which might lead it to offer 
further market access to SAARC members. India is also making an effort to reduce its 
dependence on South East Asia through developing PTAs outside the region (e.g. – 
MERCOSUR, SACU, GCC). However, here India needs to work on negotiation related 
issues which include NTMs, ROOs, services etc. 
 
India’s strategy is very much in contrast to China which remains quite 
accommodating in multilateral forum while aggressive in RTAs especially with Asian 
countries. In case of ASEAN-China FTA (ACFTA), negotiation began in late 2001 and 
by 2002 it was signed and by 2006 all products under EHS are expected to have zero 
tariffs. By 2010 it will be an FTA with ASEAN-6 and by 2015 with other members.   
Negotiations on a dispute settlement mechanism were finalised in 2004 for 
implementation in 2005. In contrast to this, India has been quite vocal in WTO forum and 
vigorously negotiated several issues, but in case of RTAs, half-heartedness is apparent. 
With many countries the negotiation is taking unusually long time and with some it has 
slowed down. Hence, India’s focus on regionalism has always remained a second priority 
vis-à-vis multilateralism. Perhaps, India is taking the RTA route to reduce its MFN rate. 
India cannot afford to abandon multilateralism as the EU and the US are the major 
importers of its services exports as well as the leading sources of FDI.  
 
It is increasingly being felt that Asian integration will be different from that of EU 
as it is jointly driven by government as well as MNCs unlike led by supranational 
institutions as in the EU. The ‘spaghetti bowl’ of Asian RTAs may lead to ‘hub and 
spokes’ kind of situation where multiple hubs such as ASEAN, China and India in future 
may get involved tug of war economic power . In this context, India’s role as an effective 
regional player is important and its involvement in RTAs/BTAs need to be studied from 
that perspective as well.  
 
The serious data constraints in India are inhibiting meaningful empirical research 
to assess the domestic impact of trade agreements especially on output and employment. 
The trade and industry data are reported in terms of HS code and National Industrial 
Classification (NIC) codes respectively. As the matching between two sets of data is 
problematic, it is difficult to model the impact of tariff reduction on the production. Also, 
non-availability of updated input-output table is responsible for inability to understand 
the impact of technology change on various sectors due to trade liberalization. 
Consequently, there is a serious problem in assessing the change in sector-wise 
productivity due to technological change and change in input use driven by trade 
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liberlisation measures and its impact on output and employment. Of late, India’s 
apprehension about the negative impact of various trade agreements is perhaps due to this 
problem. India’s strategy towards various RTAs/BTAs will be clearer when their impacts 
can be assessed scientifically.  
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Endnote: 
                                                 
i
  Currently there are more than 210 such agreements notified to the WTO, while there are 149 
member countries.  
ii
  The debate on regionalism and multilateralism is yet to provide a conclusive answer (Nataraj, 
2007). However, the trade literature notes evidences of trade diversion in blocs like EU 
(Ghoneiml, 2003); NAFTA (Fukao et al, 2002) and MERCOSUR (Bohara et al, 2001). 
iii
 For example, NAFTA’s ROO divert trade from lower- to higher-cost sources for several 
sectors. Most varieties of clothing produced in Mexico gain tariff-free access to the US and 
Canadian markets, only if inputs are sourced virtually 100 percent in North America. 
NAFTA’s 62.5 percent local content requirement on the automobile industry has induced 
Japanese automobile manufacturers with plants in Canada to produce components in the 
United States, rather than import cheaper ones from Japan (World Bank, 2000). 
iv
  Trade Complementarity Index is calculated by the following formula: 
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TC  where xij is the share of good i in global exports of country j 
and mik is the share of good i in all imports of country k. The index is zero when no goods are 
exported by one country or imported by the other and 100 when the export and import shares 
exactly match. 
v
  For an industry i with exports Xi and imports Mi the Grubel-Lloyd IIT index is: 
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−−+= . Higher value of the index indicates higher IIT. 
